The present article is dedicated to the complex position of justice in relation to civil disobedience in the legal philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The most surprising fact is that the radical rejection of any right to resistance against unjust authority lies in the express nature-legal doctrine of law. Kantian thought is quite distanced from legal positivism that diligently separates the validity of law from its content. We show that the reasons for rejecting civil disobedience can be found in another systemic location of Kant's opus, namely in the philosophy of history. It is naive to comprehend that the individual or a group can systemically contribute to a more just order by carrying out an act of resistance. The expedience of nature is a mechanism that leads the progress of history. Therefore, the Kantian prohibition on civil disobedience is not in contradiction with the aspiration for a more just order.
civil disobedience, Immanuel Kant, philosophy of law, philosophy of history